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WEIS, Circuit Judge.  
         After this petition for review of a deportation order 
was filed with us, Congress enacted a statute providing that such 
matters would not be subject to review by any court.  In the 
absence of language setting an effective date for the statute, we 
conclude that it became law on the day of enactment and withdrew 
our jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we will dismiss the petition. 
         Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, entered the 
United States in 1978 and became a permanent resident in 1983.  
In June 1993, he was convicted on charges of conspiracy to 
distribute cocaine and of aiding and abetting and was sentenced 
to forty-two months imprisonment.  His wife Amada Morales, the 
mother of his three sons, was a co-defendant. She pleaded guilty 
and was deported to Nicaragua in 1994.   
         Petitioner was released from prison after thirty-seven 
months, and thereafter, was ordered to show cause why he should 
not be deported.  After a hearing, the Immigration Judge found 
that petitioner had been rehabilitated, was truly remorseful, had 
obtained a high school equivalency diploma, was caring for his 
three minor sons, who were United States citizens, and was 
gainfully employed.  The Immigration Judge further found that 
petitioner had cooperated with the government in connection with 
his drug activities.  
         Weighing against these equities, however, the 
Immigration Judge noted that petitioner had started selling drugs 
in 1987.  After a year absence from the country, beginning in the 
middle of 1988, petitioner returned to the United States and 
resumed drug trafficking.  After the death of the individual for 
whom he had sold drugs originally, petitioner made new contacts 
and began a business of his own.  By his own testimony, he sold 
over ten kilograms of cocaine.  "[W]hile this Court has heavily 
weighed the consequences of this decision on three U.S. citizen 
children," the Immigration Judge concluded that "the well being 
of the community of the United States would not best be served by 
allowing [petitioner] to remain in the United States."   
         After reviewing the merits of the case, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals denied Salazar-Haro's appeal. 
         The petition for review was filed in this court on 
January 17, 1996.  At that time, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) provided for 
judicial review of all final orders of deportation.  On April 24, 
1996, the President signed into law the Antiterrorism and 
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996).  Title IV, section 440(a) of the Act, codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10), states:  "Any final order of 
deportation against an alien who is deportable by reason of 
having committed a criminal offense covered in section 
1251(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of this title, or any 
offense covered by section 1251(a)(2)(A)(ii) of this title for 
which both predicate offenses are covered by section 
1251(a)(2)(A)(i) of this title, shall not be subject to review by 
any court." 
         In view of this statutory provision, the INS contends 
that we should dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.  
Petitioner points out that the Act does not specify the effective 
date of the pertinent section, and that generally, statutes are 
not applied retroactively.  He also notes that precluding 
judicial review of administrative actions can give rise to 
constitutional concerns. 
         There can be little doubt that Congress has the power 
to deprive a Court of Appeals of jurisdiction previously granted 
over certain categories of cases.  Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 
(1868).  The issue before us is whether such action may 
retroactively affect cases commenced before the repealer, 
including those at various stages in the appellate process.  
         In McCardle, a statute permitting appeals in habeas 
corpus matters from the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court was 
repealed after the case had been argued before the Supreme Court, 
but before entry of judgment.  The Court held that "no judgment 
could be rendered in a suit after the repeal of the act under 
which it was brought and prosecuted."  Id. at 514.  "Jurisdiction 
is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the 
only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the 
fact and dismissing the cause."  Id.    
         In more recent times, the Supreme Court has wrestled 
with the complex problem of statutory retroactivity, particularly 
when, as here, the legislation is silent as to both its effective 
date and congressional intention.  In Landgraf v. USI Film 
Products, 511 U.S. 244, 114 S.Ct. 1483 (1994), the Court 
discussed the presumption against retroactive legislation, 
noting:  "Since the early days of this Court, we have declined to 
give retroactive effect to statutes burdening private rights 
unless Congress had made clear its intent."  114 S.Ct. at 1499.  
On the other hand, "[w]e have regularly applied intervening 
statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not 
jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the 
suit was filed."  Id. at 1501.  The Landgraf Court cited with 
approval Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 116-17 (1952), 
which stated:  "This rule  -- that, when a law conferring 
jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending 
cases, all cases fall with the law -- has been adhered to 
consistently by this Court."  See also The Assessors v. Osbornes, 
76 U.S. 567 (1869).   
         Therefore, unlike situations where retroactivity would 
affect pre-existing rights, withdrawal of jurisdiction, although 
realistically disrupting settled expectations, does not preserve 
pending litigation.  Of course, by expressing its intention, 
Congress could provide that a court continue to process cases not 
yet adjudicated.  Alternatively, Congress could direct the court 
to exercise its discretion, as is true with respect to procedural 
rules, which are applicable to pending cases "insofar as just and 
practicable."  No such language, however, appears in Title IV of 
the Antiterrorism Act.   
         We have carefully reviewed Title IV to determine 
whether Congress provided expressly, or by implication, that the 
effective date of the section under consideration here would be 
other than the day of enactment.  We have found no such 
indication, and thus, agree with similar conclusions by the 
Courts of Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.  SeeHincapie-
Nieto v. INS, ___ F.3d ____, 1996 WL 431750 (2d Cir. 
August 2, 1996); Duldulao v. INS, 90 F.3d 396 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Mendez-Rosas v. INS, 87 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 1996).  We hold, 
therefore, that the amendment to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) became 
effective on the day of enactment, April 24, 1996.   
         In addition to the three decisions by the Courts of 
Appeals cited above, we have carefully read the opinion of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Reyes- 
Hernandez v. INS, 89 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1996).  There, the Court 
reasoned that it was unlikely Congress intended to withdraw 
jurisdiction where an applicant for discretionary relief had at 
least a colorable defense to deportability but conceded that fact 
in the administrative process in order to take his chances on 
appeal to the court.  Although this approach is appealing, we do 
not find it persuasive.  We hold, therefore, that the amendment 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10) is applicable to this case and 
withdraws our jurisdiction to review the petition on the merits.  
         We think it appropriate to note that our ruling is a 
narrow one and is confined to the circumstances in this case 
where the petitioner seeks review of a final order of 
deportation.  Like the Hincapie-Nieto Court, we do not foreclose 
judicial review of all claims by aliens arising in the course of 
deportation proceedings.   
         The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that "the 
power to expel or exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental sovereign 
attribute exercised by the Government's political departments 
largely immune from judicial control."  Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 
787, 792 (1977) (citations omitted).  Consequently, Congress is 
free to make rules that would be unacceptable if applied to 
citizens.  Id.  Nevertheless, "[i]t is well established that the 
Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in 
deportation proceedings."  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 
(1993) (citing The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100-01 
(1903)).   
         To the extent, therefore, that constitutional rights 
applicable to aliens may be at stake, judicial review may not be 
withdrawn by statute.  See Felker v. Turpin, ____ U.S. ____, 116 
S.Ct. 2333 (1996) (statutory limitation on Supreme Court's 
certiorari jurisdiction does not infringe on the Court's 
constitutional power to grant habeas corpus.).  See alsoMcCardle, 74 U.S. 
at 512-14; Hincapie-Nieto, 1996 WL 431750 at 
*3-4 (noting possible habeas corpus remedies available to aliens 
under detention subject to final orders of deportation).   
         Because we do not have jurisdiction, the petition for 
review will be dismissed. 
